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Abstract
Numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage diﬀerences. I demon-
strate that the motive may be a mix of fairness and strategy, maximizing the use of
union bargaining power in the presence of eﬃciency wages. Relying on employers to
voluntarily increase higher wages, to protect eﬃciency-enhancing wage-diﬀerences,
unions can focus on increasing the lowest wages without sacrificing higher wages
much. In fact, if these “domino eﬀects” are strong enough, an egalitarian wage
policy may even increase the median wage.
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1 Introduction
A large empirical literature suggests that unions increase wages and reduce wage diﬀer-
ences. They reduce wage diﬀerences associated with skills, education and tenure, both
between and within firms and plants.1 Since unions primarily raise the lower tail of the
wage distribution,2 the unions’ egalitarian preferences appear to reach far beyond the
median member’s immediate self interest.
The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (“LO”) asserts that their motive for favoring
their least productive members is partly a matter of fairness but partly also a matter of
strategy:
“Even if only a few people are aﬀected directly, increasing the lowest wages is
absolutely decisive for the wage level of the entire group.”3
A union report explains that increasing the lowest wages causes a domino eﬀect. If the
unions manage to “push the bottom,” they can rely on the employers to increase the wages
of employees who have ended up too close to the new lowest wage. Such domino eﬀects
subsequently propagate through the entire wage distribution.4
The Swedish Employers’ Confederation oppose increasing the lowest wages.5 They
argue that increasing the lowest wages increases the total wage cost by more than the
direct cost. If the lowest wages are increased, the employers have to increase wages higher
up in the distribution. The purpose is to restore wage diﬀerences, to maintain worker
incentives and firm productivity.6
The logic of the domino argument thus remains obscure. It is not clear why the unions
succeed in increasing the lowest wages by much, given that the employers are aware of the
domino eﬀects and resist increasing the lowest wages in proportion to the total increase in
wage cost. It is also not clear why the median workers would gain more from increasing
the wages at the bottom, relying on the domino eﬀects, than from focusing the union’s
bargaining power on their own wages directly. This paper provides answers to these
questions.
1The exact numbers depend on the country, the time period and the methodology used. See reviews
by Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984), Kaufaman (2002), Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) and Card, Lemieux
and Ridell (2004). Recent studies, emphasizing causality, use a regression discontinuity design based on
union certification elections and compare the outcomes in establishments where unions barely won with
those where unions barely lost. See DiNardo and Lee (2004), Lee and Mas (2009) and Frandsen (2011).
2This feature was first noted by Freeman (1980). For a recent study based on a regression discontinuity
design, see Frandsen (2011).
3Landsorganisationen (2011); Kommunal (2003).
4Kommunal (2004).
5The Swedish Employers’ Confederation lists its opposition to increasing the lowest wages first among
its five top priorities in the wage negotiations (Svenskt Näringsliv, 2012).
6Meidner (1974); Elvander (1988).
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The main results explained The key to the domino argument is that wage diﬀerences
enhance firm productivity. A firm may increase its productivity by oﬀering a wage pre-
mium e.g. to those who invest in more education or to those who volunteer for jobs with
less desirable attributes e.g. in terms of location, safety, and cleanliness.7 If unions raise
these wages by way of negotiations, employers need not oﬀer any premium for eﬃciency
reasons. Union bargaining power is wasted.
It may then be better for the union majority to use their collective bargaining power
primarily to raise the lowest wages. One way would be to elect a leadership with pro-
nounced preferences for equal wages. Higher wages at the bottom subsequently spill over
into higher wages also for those higher up in the wage distribution. These pay increases
for the better paid workers are voluntarily added by the employers to maintain wage dif-
ferences for eﬃciency reasons. This way, the union bargaining premium is added to the
eﬃciency wage premium.
Expressed diﬀerently, when wage diﬀerences are important for productivity, the union
members need not pay the full price for fairness. Part of the cost can be passed on to the
employers. As a result, the median workers may favor a radical wage policy, even if they
have relatively weak preferences for fairness.8 Moreover, if the domino eﬀects are strong
enough, an egalitarian wage policy may even lead to a higher median wage.
My analysis suggest that the domino strategy also has some limitations, however.
The lowest paid workers unambiguously gain from an egalitarian wage policy. Also
the total wage share is unambiguously increased. But for the better paid majority there
is a trade-oﬀ. The disadvantage is that they have to allow the lowest paid workers a
larger cut of the wage share. The advantage is that the wage share is increased when the
employers voluntarily add an eﬃciency wage premium to the bargaining premium. If the
eﬃciency wage premium is large compared to the bargaining premium, also the better
paid majority gains from an egalitarian wage policy. Otherwise, not.
The union’s emphasis on fairness in the negotiations must also be suﬃciently strong to
benefit all members. A weak preference for fairness increases the lowest wages, but at the
cost of wage cuts at the top. Thus, unless the members actually have strong preferences
for fairness, the union may not even discover the strategic benefits of an egalitarian wage
policy. In fact, it is possible that Swedish unions only discovered this idea after their wage
policy was radicalized partly for ideological reasons in the late 1960:ies.
7Some theories suggest the opposite, that within-firm wage diﬀerences may reduce firm productivity
(Akerloﬀ and Yellen, 1988; Levine, 1991). But since the empirical literature shows that employers prefer
relatively large wage diﬀerences, it seems likely that the net eﬀect of wage diﬀerences on productive
eﬃciency is positive. There is also some more direct empirical evidence that performance pay and wage
inequality actually increases firm productivity see Lazear (2000); Bingley and Eriksson (2001); Heyman
(2005); Lallemand et al. (2009); Gielen et al. (2010); Dohmen and Falk (2011).
8To explain why the median workers devote so much bargaining power to increase the lowest wages,
only their aversion to advantageous inequity matters. In experimental studies, many subjects exhibit such
aversion to advantageous inequality. But this eﬀect seems to be significantly weaker than their aversion
to disadvantageous inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
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Once the strategic benefit is discovered, my results suggest that the union will wish to
pursue a very radical policy, emphasizing fairness much more than the median member’s
true preferences motivates.9 This is an instance of strategic commitment (Schelling, 1960).
But such strategic commitment is a delicate task. To be eﬀective, the union must convince
the employers that the union will act in the interest of the low paid, rather than the median
member. It must be clear that the union is prepared to call a strike for the lowest wages
and that it does not accept increases at the top as a substitute. Such commitment may
e.g. arise if it is well-known that the union leadership is more radical than the median
member. But, to be sustainable, the union must also mobilize support for the radical
policy among its members, either by evoking or strengthening the sense of solidarity
among its members or by explaining the logic of strategic commitment.10
Contribution While this paper formalizes ideas put forward by Swedish unions and
employers, the key mechanism ensues from the interaction of union bargaining power with
eﬃciency wages. And since eﬃciency wages is a ubiquitous phenomenon, the “domino
theory” may have relevance for understanding union bargaining strategy also in other
countries.
While this paper may help interpret existing stylized facts, it does not include any
additional empirical work to validate the suggested interpretation. The paper also builds
on already well-known theoretical building blocks, primarily eﬃciency wages and bargain-
ing theory. The innovation is simply to combine these building blocks to produce a new
explanation of why unions devote so much energy on increasing the lowest wages.
Understanding the egalitarian behavior of unions is important for many reasons. A
better model of union behavior may e.g. contribute to our understanding of why wage
inequality has increased and why the wage share has decreased after the 1970:ies. Cur-
rent research suggests that technological change and increased (international) competition
have been the primary drivers of these changes. But also reductions in union bargaining
power has probably played a role. Union bargaining power is reasonably assumed to have
fallen with reduced trade union density and reduced collective bargaining coverage.11 My
analysis suggests an additional reason why unions may have mattered, at least in countries
where they remain fairly strong. In the presence of domino eﬀects, modest reductions in
the workers’ preferences for fairness may have a noticeable impact on union wage policy
which, in turn, may have contributed to both increasing wage inequality and a reduced
wage share. And, at least in Sweden, the blue-collar union members’ aversion to inequity
9In contrast, Rey-Biel (2008) demonstrates that employers may sometimes exploit the workers aversion
to inequity by oﬀering contracts which create inequity oﬀ-equilibrium, i.e., when employees do not meet
the eﬀort targets.
10Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2015) discuss various forms of solidarity and their role for unions,
with a focus on international issues.
11See e.g. OECD (2012). See also Western & Rosenfeld (2011) for a recent contribution arguing that
unions may have played a larger role than previously thought.
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actually has decreased somewhat during the last decades.12
Another reason is that, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, there has been
considerable political pressure to lower collectively negotiated minimum wages especially
in Greece but also in other European countries including Sweden (see e.g. Bloomberg,
2012). To predict the eﬀects of such policies clearly requires an understanding of the
unions’ egalitarian behavior. These issues are further discussed in a companion paper
(Stennek, 2015).
2 Related literature
Freeman (1980, 1982) argues that American unions have several motives for reducing
the dispersion of (blue collar) wages within firms, namely that (i) the median worker
earns less than the average, that (ii) solidarity is diﬃcult to maintain if some workers
are paid markedly more than others and that (iii) workers prefer objective standards over
subjective decisions by foremen.13
Farber and Saks (1980) provide some support for the self-interested median voter ar-
gument. They demonstrate that the likelihood that an individual will vote for union
representation declines as his or her wage increases relative to others in the same bargain-
ing unit. However, Parsons (1982) demonstrates that this voting behavior is the same
across bargaining units, independent of whether the median worker earns more or less than
the average. He also estimates that the eﬀect of group voting power on the rents received
by group members is small and in some cases anomalous in sign. Freeman’s (1980) and
Frandsen’s (2011) find that unions primarily raise the lower tail of the wage distribution.
The empirical evidence is thus not supportive of any simple median voter model of union
rent distribution policies. Also simple altruism and solidarity arguments are weakened by
the fact that more skilled workers are less supportive of union representation.
So, what might explain that unions increase the wages of the lowest paid minori-
ties? Bishop, Formby and Smith (1991) and Agell and Lommerud (1993) argue that the
self-interested median voter argument may explain such redistribution, if extended to in-
corporate the workers’ uncertainty about their future position in the wage distribution
and risk-aversion. My model will allow for the workers to be risk-averse and to care about
fairness. In fact, risk-aversion and equity concerns interact with the domino eﬀects.
Gottfries and Sjöström (2000) present an “insider-outsider explanation” for why unions
increase starting wages. According to the insider-outsider theory firms would replace the
currently employed if the diﬀerence between their wages and the starting wages exceeds
12This is documented in recurrent surveys (LO, 2011b). See also Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman
(2015).
13Freeman also suggests that the advantage of standardizing rates between firms is worker solidarity
and to (iv) simplify the policing of the union cartel agreement. In addition, he also shows that blue collar
unions reduce the gap between blue and white collar workers.
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the labor turnover cost. The unions must therefore increase starting wages by the same
amount that they wish to increase the insiders’ wages.
Frandsen (2011) presents an “agency explanation” for why unions pursue egalitarian
wage policies. He assumes that a union leadership facing a U.S. style certification election
will commit to a wage policy that maximizes the probability of winning. He argues that
the dollar amount by which a union has to increase a worker’s earnings to make him
indiﬀerent between a union and no union is increasing in a worker’s outside wage. One
reason is that union dues are commonly collected as a percentage of wages. Thus it is
more eﬃcient for the union to shift resources to attract the votes of lower-skilled workers.
Ripple eﬀects The domino theory implies that unions not only compress wages, but
also increase wages for workers further up the wage distribution. This prediction distin-
guishes it from theories that suggest that unions achieve wage compression by lowering
wages at the top of the distribution and increasing those at the bottom.
The crucial element of the domino argument is that there exists a positive link between
lower and higher wages. This particular mechanism is consistent with some stylized facts.
It has been noted that increases in statutory minimum wages, which may be considered
exogenous by individual firms and unions, increase wages higher up in the distribution,
so-called ripple or spillover eﬀects. Estimates from diﬀerent countries diﬀer, but studies
for the U.S. find spillovers from economy-wide minimum wages up to the 25th percentile.14
Previous theoretical research has identified possible reasons for the ripple eﬀects: they may
arise when employers substitute and increase demand for skilled workers (Manning, 2003),
or since status-conscious skilled workers would reduce work eﬀort to express dissatisfaction
with compressed wage diﬀerences (Grossman, 1983). Phelan (2014) finds evidence that
ripple eﬀects arise as a result of supply substitution rather than demand substitution.
Firms are forced to increase higher wages to maintain compensating wage diﬀerences,
which fits well with the domino theory.
There are also a few empirical studies of how collectively negotiated minimum wages
aﬀect the wage structure based on Swedish data. These studies are concerned with the
second phase of the solidaristic wage policy.15 The second phase started in the late 1960:ies
when LO started “striving for the elimination of all wage diﬀerentials, however caused”.
The reason for this shift was partly the more radical spirit of the time. And it occurred
despite the unions’ belief that smaller wage diﬀerences within firms would actually hurt
14For a review, see Neumark and Wascher, 2007.
15During the first phase of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s (LO’s) so-called solidaristic wage
policy, which lasted until the end of the 1960:ies, LO was mainly concerned with wage diﬀerence between
firms and industries. The unions argued that nation-wide agreements to reduce such wage diﬀerences
would enhance productive eﬃciency by speeding up the movement of labor and capital from low to high
productive activities (Meidner, 1974). This idea has later been reinforced in formal models (Agell and
Lommerud, 1993; and Moene and Wallerstein, 1997) and empirical analyses (Hibbs and Locking, 2000).
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firm productivity (Meidner, 1974).16 Using data from 1971 to 1992, Edin and Holmlund
(1994) and Östros (1994) show that youth-specific minimum wages in various industries
give rise to spill-overs for the young workers in these industries.17
Hibbs and Locking (1996), using more aggregate data, show that union pushes to
level wage diﬀerences at the national level exerted large positive eﬀects on both centrally
negotiated wage changes and local wage drift. The wage drift typically favored the high
paid, partly oﬀsetting the equalizing eﬀects of the central agreements.
This finding, that egalitarian wage policies lead to higher wage costs, is corroborated
by the Swedish employers. They increasingly opposed a general wage leveling, in favor of
an eﬃciency-wage policy (Meidner, 1974; Elvander, 1988). The employers argued that the
attempts to reduce wage diﬀerences was part of the reason for the ever higher wage costs in
Sweden. The reason is that the centrally agreed reductions of wage diﬀerences are partly
neutralized by wage drift, i.e. locally agreed increases of the higher wages. The local
parties restore the wage diﬀerences to increase worker incentives and firm productivity.
Strategic delegation The main assertion of the domino theory is that (in the presence
of ripple eﬀects) the wage share will be higher, the more a union cares for the lowest wages.
An implication is that unions may even have an incentive to commit to a more radical
policy than motivated by the members’ preferences for fairness alone. One commitment
method would be the use of strategic delegation.
It may thus be possible to base an empirical test of the domino theory on the pre-
diction that the union members will elect a leadership that is more radical than they are
themselves. Lewin (1980) presents Swedish data from a 1974 mail survey about wage
policy preferences among union members and oﬃcials. The survey was sent to a sample
of approximately 2300 members and 800 oﬃcers from diﬀerent unions aﬃliated with LO.
The response rate was above 90 percent. To assess the members’ egalitarian attitudes, the
respondents where asked to agree or disagree with the claim: “Higher paid groups within
LO should support the low-income earners, even if this means that their own demands
are set aside.” Table 1 shows that there was strong support for egalitarian policies both
among regular members and members elected to section, local and central committees.18
Among the regular members, 78 percent expressed support an egalitarian policy. But the
table also reveals diﬀerences between members and union oﬃcials. Support for the policy
increases with the hierarchical level. Among members of central committees, 94 percent
16LO believed that reducing wage diﬀerences without hurting firm productivity would require a system
of job evaluations. After having failed to construct such a system, the organization saw pushes for uniform
increases in cents rather than in percentage terms as a good enough approximation of the ideal policy.
17For a review, see Skedinger (2007).
18Note that the support for egalitarianism may reflect both a wish to level wage diﬀerences between
sectors and firms (the so-called Rhen-Meidner model) and wage diﬀerences within firms, which is the
focus in the present paper.
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Table 1: “Higher paid groups within LO should support the low-income earners, even if
this means that their own demands are set aside.”
Members Section committee Local committee Central committee
Yes 78 % 85 87 94
No 22 15 13 6
Total 100 (N = 2084) 100 (N = 241) 100 (N = 327) 100 (N = 249)
expressed support for an egalitarian policy. These diﬀerences are statistically significant.19
And, clearly, strategic delegation is one possible explanation for these diﬀerences.20
3 Model
To concentrate on wage diﬀerences within firms, the model consists of a single firm.21 The
firm hires two types of blue-collar workers called B (“the lowest paid”) and A (“everybody
else”). The share of B-workers is small,   < 12 . That is, the median worker is of type A.
This simple two-type model allows me to study the stylized fact that unions focus their
bargaining power on their lowest paid minorities.
The model assumes for simplicity that all workers are organized and that a collective
agreement thus automatically covers all workers. The model may, however, also have rel-
evance in case the union does not succeed to attract all workers as members. The reason
is that a collective wage agreement between a firm and a union obliges the firm to pay
the same stipulated wages not only to union members but also to unorganized workers.22
Moreover, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, which is used here, includes a pa-
rameter to represent the union’s bargaining strength. This parameter may be viewed as
a “black box” representation of union density and collective agreement coverage.
The timing of events is described in figure 1. First, the workers choose a wage policy.
The wage policy describes the union’s preferences over wages in diﬀerent jobs. This choice
19For the alternative hypothesis that the proportion of regular members supporting an egalitarian wage
policy is the same as the proportion of section committee members, the p-value is 0.0012 < 0.05, so we
may reject the null hypothesis of equality and conclude that the proportions are diﬀerent.
20There are several reasons to be cautious with the conclusions. One reason is that a union leadership
may improve the union’s bargaining position by evoking or strengthening the sense of solidarity among its
members, thereby reducing the diﬀerence in opinion between the leadership and the members. Another
reason is that union oﬃcials may be more radical than member if radical individuals are more prone to
run for union oﬃces.
21An alternative interpretation of the model is that there are many identical firms represented by a
single employers’ federation aiming to maximize aggregate profits.
22In the United States for example, the Federal Labor Relations Authority certifies unions as exclusive
representatives of employees in appropriate units. An exclusive representative is entitled to act for
and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering all employees in the unit. It is responsible for
representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without
regard to labor organization membership (FLRA, 2014). In countries with centralized bargaining, as is
common in Europe, collective agreements signed by employer’s federations are often extended, often by
law, to cover also non-member firms (see e.g OECD, 1994).
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Figure 1: Time Line
may also be thought of as electing the union leadership, which is responsible for the wage
negotiations with the employers (section 5). Second, the union and the firm bargain over
the wages (section 4). Statutory minimum wages, if any, are not binding. Third, the
workers decide which type of job they wish to apply for and the firm hires all applicants
for which the expected profit is positive (section 3). The model is analyzed backwards,
to establish a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
The model abstracts from important arguments against increased wage costs. The firm
is not put at a competitive disadvantage by increased wages. There is also no inflation
nor any unemployment in equilibrium (relaxed in section 6.1).
3.1 Job applications and hiring
The present section analyzes the third stage, job applications and hiring. The key property
of this part of the model is that wage diﬀerences increase the firm’s productivity. To
make it simple, there are only two levels of productivity: firm productivity is high if the
diﬀerence between the wages earned by the two groups of workers exceeds a threshold;
otherwise it is low. To be concrete, I use an adverse selection model. But the same formal
model may be interpreted many diﬀerent ways, as discussed in Section 6.2.
Production There are two types of jobs or techniques. Every worker who takes a “L-
job” adds the value vL to the firm and every worker who takes an “H-job” adds the value
vH > vL. A possible interpretation is that H-jobs produce more units of output in any
given time period. An alternative interpretation is that they produce the same number
of units but that the quality is higher which means that their output can be sold at a
higher price. Yet another interpretation is that “other costs” are lowered by using the
H-technique. The total value of production is simply the sum of values produced by the
workers. For example, if all workers, of both types, carry out L-jobs, the total value is
vL. But, if all the A-workers carry out H-jobs and all the B-workers carry out L-jobs, the
total value is higher and given by   · vL + (1   ) · vH .
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Utility A worker’s disutility of eﬀort is an increasing and convex function of the value
produced. In particular, I assume that the disutility is quadratic and given by dji =
di · (vj)2 for both types of workers, i = A and i = B. (Note that sub-indexes are used
to diﬀerentiate worker types and super-indexes are used to diﬀerentiate jobs.) I also
assume that the disutility of eﬀort is higher for the B-workers than for the A-workers,
i.e. dB > dA. These assumptions entail that the usual “single crossing” conditions for
screening in adverse selection models are satisfied. The single-crossing conditions are
given by dLB > dLA and
dHB   dLB > dHA   dLA. (1)
The utility of a worker of type i who takes a job of type j is given by u = wj   dji , where
wj is the wage in job j.23 The utility outside employment is normalized to zero. Thus,
the disutility of work must be interpreted broadly to include e.g. the lost value of leisure
and unemployment benefits.
Eﬃciency The number of L- and H-jobs are endogenous; they are determined by job
applications and hiring decisions. Eﬃciency requires that the firm hires the B-workers to
carry out L-jobs if
vL   dLB > vH   dHB , (2)
and that the firm hires the A-workers to carry out H-jobs if
vH   dHA > vL   dLA. (3)
These conditions are satisfied if dB >
⇥
vH + vL
⇤ 1
> dA, which is assumed.
The maximum total surplus is denoted by S = (1   ) ·  vH   dHA  +  ·  vL   dLB  and
since the number of workers is normalized to one, the total surplus is also the average
surplus per worker.
Information The parties agree on the wage schedule
 
wL, wH
 
but cannot decide on
employment directly. Individual workers have private information about their types and
select which jobs they wish to apply for. The firm decides unilaterally what applicants
they wish to hire, but without observing their types.
In order for the parties to produce the maximum total surplus, they would have to
agree on a wage schedule that induces workers to apply for the jobs they are suited for,
while granting the firm a positive profit when hiring all applicants. In particular, the
wage schedule has to satisfy both rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for
both the workers and the firm.
23Since the disutility of eﬀort is assumed to be independent of the wage, the eﬃciency wage premium
necessary to induce A-workers to apply for H-jobs will be independent of the union bargaining power.
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Worker incentives To apply for jobs, the wages must compensate the workers for their
disutility of work. The wage paid for L-jobs has to compensate the B-workers for their
disutility of low eﬀort and the wage paid for H-jobs has to compensate the A-workers for
their disutility of high eﬀort, i.e.
wL   dLB   0, (4)
wH   dHA   0. (5)
Unless these individual rationality constraints are fulfilled, the workers would prefer to
remain unemployed. Expressed diﬀerently, the wage schedule must lie above the IRA-line
and to the right of the IRB-line in figure 2, on the following page.
The wage structure must also induce the B-workers to voluntarily choose the L-jobs
over the H-jobs and the A-workers to prefer H-jobs to L-jobs, i.e.
wL   dLB   wH   dHB , (6)
wH   dHA   wL   dLA. (7)
These incentive-compatibility constraints place restrictions on wage diﬀerences. The A-
workers’ incentive-compatibility constraint (“ICA”) requires the wage for H-jobs to be
suﬃciently high compared to the wage for L-jobs. Whatever the wage for L-jobs is, the
wage for H-jobs must be larger and compensate the A-workers for the extra eﬀort required,
i.e. wH   wL   dHA   dLA > 0. Expressed diﬀerently, the wage schedule must lie above
the ICA-line in figure 2. The incentive-compatibility constraint for the B-workers will be
excluded from now on, since it will not play any role in the analysis to follow (think of
dHB as extremely high, e.g. dHB > vH).
Firm incentives The wage structure must grant the firm a non-negative profit. When
the eﬃcient outcome is implemented, the requirement is that ⇡ =   · vL   wL +(1   ) · 
vH   wH  is positive. The wage structure must also ensure that the firm wishes to hire
both types of workers, i.e.
wH  vH (8)
wL  vL. (9)
These two right-to-manage constraints are described by the two dotted lines in figure 2.
Eﬃcient wages The gray area in figure 2, defined by inequalities (4) - (9), represents all
wage schedules inducing workers to apply for the jobs that maximize the total surplus and
also the firm to hire all applicants. I will call all such wage schedules eﬃcient and other
wage schedules non-eﬃcient. While every eﬃcient wage schedule maximizes the total
11
surplus, they entail diﬀerent divisions of this surplus between the firm and the diﬀerent
types of workers.
4 Wage setting
Before studying collective negotiations, it is instructive to note that a firm which could
set wages unilaterally would chose the wage schedule
 
wLE, w
H
E
 
described by the E-dot in
figure 2. The proof is straightforward. Any straight line parallel to the ⇡0-line, within
Figure 2: Unilateral wage setting
wL
wH
r
 
E
e
̟0
̟*
vH
vL
IRB ICA
IRA
dBL
dAH
dAH - dAL
H
L
the eﬃcient set, is an iso-profit curve. Lower lines represent higher profits. Thus, among
the eﬃcient wage schedules, profit is maximized by the one represented by the E-dot. To
maximize profits, the B-workers should simply be oﬀered compensation for their disutility
of work, i.e. wLE = dLB. This follows from the fact that the IRB-constraint is binding. The
profit-maximizing wage for the A-workers, is found by solving the binding ICA-constraint.
Thus, wHE = dLB +
 
dHA   dLA
 
, where the second term is a compensating wage diﬀerential,
compensating the A-workers for acquiring a higher education or accepting less desirable
job attributes.
An important feature of this wage schedule is the well-known eﬃciency wage premium
(or information rent) earned by the A-workers. That is, the A-workers receive a wage in
excess of the level suﬃcient to compensate them for their disutility of working:
uH = w
H
E   dHA =
⇥
dLB +
 
dHA   dLA
 ⇤  dHA = dLB   dLA ⌘ r > 0.
This monopsonistic eﬃciency wage premium is paid by the firm to prevent the A-workers
from accepting a low-paid low-eﬀort job. Therefore, the eﬃciency wage premium has
to be at least as high as the utility the A-workers would derive from choosing a L-job
(wLE dHA = dLB dLA). In figure 2 the eﬃciency wage premium is described by the distance
between the E-dot located on the incentive-compatibility constraint and the e-dot located
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on the individual rationality constraint. The A-workers do not need any bargaining power
to secure this wage premium. Even if the firm has the power to set wages unilaterally, it
oﬀers this premium to increase eﬃciency. The B-workers, on the other hand, receive no
such premium.
Finally, I need to show that the firm indeed has an incentive to implement the eﬃcient
outcome, rather than e.g. not oﬀering any low-eﬀort jobs. More generally, the condition
for the firm to implement the eﬃcient outcome turns out to be necessary and suﬃcient
for non-eﬃcient wage schedules to be Pareto dominated.
Lemma 1. Every non-eﬃcient wage schedule is Pareto dominated by some eﬃcient wage
schedule if, and only if,
  ·  vL   dLB    (1   ) ·  dLB   dLA  . (10)
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Condition 10 requires that the B-workers’ contribution to total production (which
is equal to the left hand side of the inequality) is larger than the total eﬃciency wage
premium paid by the firm (which is equal to the right hand side of the inequality).
Unless this condition is satisfied, the firm may prefer wage schedules causing B-workers
to be unemployed and A-workers to take on H-jobs without requiring an eﬃciency wage
premium.
In the remainder of the paper, I will assume that condition (10) is satisfied and that
wages are set in eﬃcient bargaining. Since all non-eﬃcient wage schedules are Pareto
dominated, the equilibrium wages will always be eﬃcient. Thus, the only remaining issue
is how the total surplus is distributed between the firm and the workers of diﬀerent types.
4.1 Collective bargaining with an extremely median-biased union
Wages are determined through collective bargaining between the union and the firm.
I represent this negotiation by the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The firm’s
objective is to maximize profit and the union’s objective is to maximize some measure of
the utility of its members. The disagreement payoﬀ is assumed to be zero for both the
firm and the workers. The asymmetric Nash product is then given by
N
 
wH , wL
 
= ⇡
 
wH , wL
 1   · U  wH , wL  
where   2 [0, 1] is the union’s bargaining power.24 For simplicity I start out assuming
24The normal interpretation of the disagreement payoﬀs is that they represent the parties’ utility levels
during a labor market conflict, even though a conflict will not occur in equilibrium. Thus, in eﬀect, I
assume that a worker’s payoﬀ during conflict is the same as when unemployed and the firm’s profits
during conflict are the same as if they would leave the market. This is clearly a simplification since
e.g. unemployment benefits may diﬀer from disbursements from strike funds. According to the standard
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that the union either only cares about the A-workers or the B-workers.
Consider first the case that the union only cares about the A-workers. Assuming
the negotiation leads to eﬃciency, the union’s payoﬀ function is given by UH
 
wH
 
=
wH dHA . The firm’s payoﬀ is its profit. The Nash product is thus given by NH
 
wH , wL
 
=⇥
  ·  vL   wL + (1   ) ·  vH   wH ⇤1   · ⇥wH   dHA ⇤ . The bargaining outcome is the
eﬃcient wage schedule maximizing the Nash product. Since the firm wishes to minimize
the wage for L-jobs and since the union does not mind, the participation constraint for
the B-workers must bind, i.e. wL = dLB. The Nash product can then be rewritten as
NH
 
wH , wL
 
=
⇥
S   (1   ) ·  wH   dHA  ⇤1   · ⇥wH   dHA ⇤  ,
where S =   ·  vL   dLB + (1   ) ·  vH   dHA   is the total surplus, which is to be shared
between a union receiving the wage premium wH   dHA and the firm receiving the rest,
S (1   )· wH   dHA  . Notice that increasing the A-workers’ wage premium only reduces
the firm’s profit in proportion to the share of A-workers, 1   .
Disregarding the incentive-compatibility and the right-to-manage constraints, the wage
premium for H-jobs is set equal to
wHeh   dHA =
1
1    ·   · S. (11)
To prove this claim, simply solve the first-order condition @NH
 
wH , dLB
 
/@wH = 0. This
wage premium is called the bargaining premium. It is simply the union’s share of the total
surplus, distributed among the A-workers. To be more precise, it is called the A-worker’s
direct bargaining premium to emphasize that it is the premium earned by the A-workers
when they use the unions bargaining power to increase their wages directly, i.e. absent
strategic delegation.
This (semi-) unconstrained maximum of the Nash product is represented by the eh-
dot in figure 3. The eh-dot is a convex combination of the e-dot and the h-dot. The
h-dot is located on the firm’s participation constraint giving the firm zero profit and thus
giving the whole surplus to the A-workers (disregarding the right-to-manage constraint).
The e-dot is located on the A-workers’ participation constraint, giving the firm the whole
surplus (disregarding the IC constraint). The exact location of the eh-dot between the
h-dot and the e-dot is determined by the parties’ bargaining power. If the union has much
bargaining power the equilibrium is close to the h-dot. If the union has little bargaining
power the equilibrium is close to the e-dot. With equal bargaining power (  = 12) as
assumed in the figure, the equilibrium is the mid point between the h-dot and the e-
dot. Clearly, the unconstrained maximum satisfies the right-to-manage constraint if the
interpretations the union has high bargaining power if it is more patient or less risk-averse than the firm.
See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for justifications.
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Figure 3: Collective bargaining: Union maximizes median wage
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union’s bargaining power is not too high.25
Taking the incentive-compatibility constraint into account is straightforward. As long
as the eh-dot satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraint (as assumed in the figure), it
must represent the bargaining outcome. Otherwise, the constrained equilibrium coincides
with the wages that the firm would set if it could dictate wages. In other words the
equilibrium wage schedule
 
wHeh, w
L
eh
 
is given by
wLeh = d
L
B,
wHeh = d
H
A +max
⇢
r,
1
1    ·   · S
 
.
The interesting feature of this agreement is that the A-workers either get the monopson-
istic eﬃciency wage premium (r) or the direct bargaining premium ( 11   ·  ·S) depending
on which is larger. But they don’t get both.
One may define the eﬃciency wage premium as any wage premium in addition to the
bargaining premium. When the union pursues a median-biased wage policy, the eﬃciency
wage premium is given by
r˜ = max
 
r   11   ·   · S, 0
 
. (12)
If the union has no bargaining power (  = 0), the eﬃciency wage premium coincides
with the monopsonistic eﬃciency wage premium (r˜ = r). If the union’s bargaining power
is increased, the A-workers’ (direct) bargaining premium is increased, but the eﬃciency
wage premium is reduced (@r˜/@  < 0). Due to the simplicity of the model the eﬃciency
wage premium is reduced by the same amount as the bargaining premium is increased,
25The right-to-manage constraint is satisfied if and only if  1   ·  1   · v
L dLB
vH dHA
 1. A suﬃcient condition
is that    12 . But with very few minimum-wage earners, any    1 is allowed.
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until the eﬃciency wage premium is completely eliminated. One may thus say that the
bargaining premium and the eﬃciency wage premium are substitutes. Intuitively, the
higher the wage premium the A-workers can secure through collective bargaining, the
lower is the additional eﬃciency wage premium that the firm has to oﬀer A-workers to
make them accept the high-eﬀort jobs.
Some readers may find it disturbing that the Nash bargaining solution is determined as
a convex combination of the e-dot and and the h-dot, given that not even the firm would
set the wage as low as dHA . The lowest wage the A-workers would credibly be held down to
in the negotiation is dHA + r. It should be noted, however, that since the A-workers loose
the eﬃciency wage premium during a conflict, it does not add to their bargaining power.
The eﬃciency wage premium is irrelevant for the Nash bargaining outcome, except as a
constraint.26
4.2 Collective bargaining with an extremely egalitarian union
Consider second the case that the union only cares about the B-workers. Assuming
the negotiation leads to eﬃciency, the union’s payoﬀ function is given by UL
 
wL
 
=
wL   dLB. The firm’s payoﬀ is its profit and the Nash product is given by NL
 
wH , wL
 
=⇥
  ·  vL   wL + (1   ) ·  vH   wH ⇤1   · ⇥wL   dLB⇤ . Again, the bargaining outcome
is the eﬃcient wage schedule maximizing the Nash product. Since the firm wishes to
minimize the wage for the H-jobs and since the union does not mind, the incentive com-
patibility constraint for the A-workers must bind, i.e. wH = wL +
 
dHA   dLA
 
. The Nash
product can then be rewritten as
NL
 
wH , wL
 
=
h
S˜    wL   dLB i1   · ⇥wL   dLB⇤  . (13)
In eﬀect, the negotiation is concerned with sharing a perceived surplus equal to S˜ =
S   (1   ) · r between a union receiving the B-premium wL   dLB and the firm receiving
S˜    wL   dLB . Since none of the parties care about the A-workers’ welfare they simply
perceive the eﬃciency wage premium (1   ) · r as a cost of production that should be
deducted from S. Also notice that increasing the B-workers’ wage premium reduces the
firm’s profit by the same amount since also the A-workers’ wage is increased at the same
time.
Sharing the perceived surplus according to bargaining power implies that the wage
26Interpreted properly, this critique is simply an instance of an already well-known argument against
that Nash bargaining solution, namely that it satisfies the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” axiom
(which is a misnomer). Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) suggest an alternative bargaining solution replacing
the independence axiom with a monotonicity requirement. In the present context the requirement is that
wHeh should be increasing in r. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the bargaining premium and the
eﬃciency wage premium are substitutes, also with this solution.
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premium for L-jobs is set equal to
wLel   dLB =   · S˜.
The wage premium for H-jobs is thus given by
wHel   dHA =   · S˜ + r.
Note that   ·S˜ is the B-workers’ bargaining premium but indirectly it is also the A-workers’
bargaining premium.
Recall that the A-workers’ eﬃciency wage premium is any wage premium in addition
to the bargaining premium. Since the A-workers receive the same bargaining premium
as the B-workers, it is necessary to add the monopsonistic eﬃciency wage premium, r, to
induce the A-workers to volunteer for the more H-jobs.27
The equilibrium wages are represented by the el-dot in figure 4 which is simply a
convex combination of the l-dot and the E-dot. In a Nash negotiation, the two parties
Figure 4: Collective bargaining: Union maximizes lowest wage.
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must share the surplus according to bargaining power. The l-dot, located on the firm’s
participation constraint, gives the union the whole surplus and the E-dot located on the
B-workers’ participation constraint, gives the firm the whole surplus.
4.3 Comparing the two extreme policies
The union’s wage policy aﬀects the equilibrium wages. Not surprisingly the B-workers’
wage is higher when the union pursues an egalitarian wage policy, i.e. wLel   dLB =   · S˜ >
27To prove this claim, simply solve the first-order condition @NL
 
wH
 
wL
 
, wL
 
/@wL = 0. The wage
satisfies the right-to-manage constraint if and only if  (1  )1  ·   v
L dLB
(vH dHA ) r
. A suﬃcient condition that
the union’s bargaining power is not too large. If the right-to-manage constraints bind, the constrained
equilibrium is given by the L-dot.
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0 = wLeh   dLB. Given that wage diﬀerences improve productive eﬃciency and that the
firms oppose wage leveling, it should be expected that an egalitarian wage policy is costly
for the union, in the sense that an egalitarian wage policy is associated with a lower total
wage bill. It turns out that the opposite is true: An egalitarian wage policy results in a
higher total wage bill.28 The intuition is explained after the next lemma.
For the A-workers, the union’s choice of wage policy implies a trade-oﬀ between the
bargaining premium and the eﬃciency wage premium. The disadvantage with an egal-
itarian wage policy is that it reduces the A-workers’ bargaining premium. That is, the
“indirect” bargaining premium is smaller than the “direct” bargaining premium:
  · [S   (1   ) · r]  1
1    ·   · S.
There are two reasons for this inequality. First, a minimum-wage maximizing union
perceives the surplus to be smaller since the eﬃciency wage premium is considered a cost
of production that is deducted from the total surplus. Second, the union’s bargaining
surplus is shared between all workers, including the B-workers. The advantage with an
egalitarian wage policy is that it increases the A-workers’ eﬃciency wage premium:
r   max r   11   ·   · S, 0 .
The reason is that when the union maximizes the wage in H-jobs, the eﬃciency wage
premium is reduced by the bargaining premium.
The first main result of the paper is that the A-workers sometimes earn more if wage
negotiations are delegated to an agent who only cares about the lowest wage rather than
to one who only cares about the median wage. Clearly, if r > 11   ·   · S the A-workers
would waist all their bargaining power by focusing on their own wage directly. Then an
egalitarian wage policy increases the median wage. But also in the opposite case, the
A-workers sometimes earn a higher wage with an egalitarian wage policy, as revealed by
figure 4. The condition is
r > ✓ · 1
1    ·   · S, (14)
where ✓ =  1  ·(1  ) < 1. In summary:
Lemma 2. The median workers’ wage is higher under an extreme egalitarian wage policy
than under a median-biased wage policy if and only if the monopsonistic eﬃciency wage
premium is large enough compared to the direct bargaining premium.
28With a median-biased wage policy the total wage premium is (1   ) ·  wHeh   dHA   =
max {(1   ) · r,  · S}. With an egalitarian wage policy, the total wage premium is   ·  wLel   dLB  +
(1   ) ·  wHel   dHA   =   · S˜ + (1   ) · r =   · S + (1   ) · (1   ) · r. Thus, an egalitarian wage policy
increases the total wage bill if (1   ) · r    · S or if (1   ) · r >   · S and S   (1   ) · r. The last
inequality is implied by 10.
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Intuitively, if the union uses its bargaining power to push up the wage for the more
H-jobs, the firm does not need to add any eﬃciency wage premium to guarantee that
A-workers take on these jobs. If the union redirects its bargaining power to push up the
wage for L-jobs, it may rely on the firm to voluntarily top up the A-workers’ wages to
protect eﬃciency-enhancing wage diﬀerences. The A-workers will get the eﬃciency wage
premium on the side.
4.4 General union preferences
Consider now the general case when the union’s objective function both attaches a weight
↵   0 on the B-workers’ wage premium and a weight 1   ↵   0 on the A-workers’ wage
premium. That is, the union’s wage policy is described by
U↵
 
wH , wL
 
= (1  ↵) ·  wH   dHA  + ↵ ·  wL   dLB  ,
when the eﬃcient outcome is implemented.
The analysis above investigated the two extreme cases when ↵ = 0 and ↵ = 1. Figure
5 illustrates the relation between the equilibrium wages earned by the two groups and the
Figure 5: Equilibrium wages with generalized policy
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strength of the union’s equity concern, for all ↵ 2 [0, 1], for the case when condition 14 is
satisfied. The B-workers wage is increasing in ↵. More interestingly, the A-workers wage
is quasi-convex in ↵.29
To understand the figure, note that the firm is willing to agree on any reallocation of
wages keeping the profit constant (i.e. along an iso-profit curve within the feasible set).
If the union is relatively median-biased, giving B-workers a lower weight in the objective
29Actually, this convexity could be strengthened by using a somewhat more realistic but complicated
model. In particular, the A-worker’s wage would be strictly decreasing in ↵ (at a decreasing rate), for
↵ below some ...↵ , and then strictly increasing (at an increasing rate) for ↵ above ...↵ . In particular, this
would be the case if the union’s wage policy would be multiplicative, i.e. U↵ = (1  ↵) · ln
 
wH   dHA
 
+
↵ · ln  wL   dLB , rather than linear as assumed here.
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function than their share of the workforce (i.e. ↵ <  ), the union wishes to maximize
wH on any iso-profit curve. Thus, IRB must bind in equilibrium (assuming that the
union’s bargaining power is insuﬃcient to capture the A-workers’ total productivity). It
follows that wL = dLB. Maximizing the Nash product over wH yields the same solution
independent of ↵ <  . The solution must therefore coincide with the solution when the
union only cares about the median wage premium, ↵ = 0, derived above.
If the union is egalitarian, giving B-workers a higher weight in the objective func-
tion than their share of the workforce (i.e. ↵ >  ), the union wishes to maximize wL
on any iso-profit curve. Thus, ICA binds in equilibrium (assuming that the union’s
bargaining power is insuﬃcient to capture the B-workers’ total productivity). Thus,
wH = wL +
 
dHA   dLB
 
+ r, and the Nash product can be rewritten as N
 
wH , wL
 
=h
S˜    wL   dLB i1   · ⇥ wL   dLB + (1  ↵) · r⇤ . Solving the first-order condition gives
wL↵   dLB =   · S˜   (1   ) · (1  ↵) · r. And the median wage premium is wH↵   dHA =
  · S˜ + r   (1   ) · (1  ↵) · r. Both premia are increasing in ↵. The intuition is simple:
the union is weakened by considering the eﬃciency wage premium r = dLB   dLA > 0 as a
gain in the negotiation.
For future reference I define ↵˜ >   to be the weight on the B-workers wage premium
such that wH↵ = wHeh whenever condition 14 is satisfied.
5 Choice of wage policy
Before the collective bargaining starts, the union members must decide what wage policy
the union should pursue. The wage policy would be codified in oﬃcial documents but
also embodied in the members’ choice of the union’s leadership, e.g. the chief wage
negotiator.30 Here, the wage policy is simply modeled as the union’s objective function,
U↵. The question is what weight ↵ the union should attach to the B-workers’ wage.
As unions are democratic organizations, I assume that the wage policy ↵ is chosen to
maximize the utility of the median workers. Clearly, if the B-workers would constitute the
majority, the union would pursue an egalitarian wage policy. But the evidence suggests
that unions emphasize the wages of low-paid minorities. To understand this phenomenon
within a two-type model, I need to study the case when the median worker has the higher
wage.
30For example, Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union revised its wage policy 1993 (emphasizing eﬃciency)
and 2004 (emphasizing equality). These changes occurred after changes in the leadership.
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5.1 Fairness and risk
Surveys suggest that union members care about fairness.31 The sense of fairness varies over
time and most likely between diﬀerent countries. To model fairness concerns in a simple
yet flexible way, I use the format suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Since the median
worker decides the union’s wage policy, I only need to describe the A-workers’ preferences.
Since the A-workers wage premium is higher than the B-workers wage premium, I only
need to specify the A-workers’ distaste for advantageous inequity. Thus, the A-workers’
utility is given by
u↵0 =
 
wH   dHA
   ↵0 · ⇥ wH   dHA     wL   dLB ⇤ ,
where ↵0 2 [0, 1] measures how averse they are to advantageous inequity. (This parameter
is normally denoted by   in the fairness literature.) Notice that I, for simplicity, only
consider equity norms (comparisons of wage premia) and not equality norms (comparison
of wages). An increase in the strength of the median workers’ solidarity with the lowest
paid workers is thus simply described by an increase in ↵0.32
Notice that the A-workers’ utility function can also be rewritten as
u↵0 = (1  ↵0) ·
 
wH   dHA
 
+ ↵0 ·  wL   dLB  .
The parameter ↵0 may then be interpreted as a rudimentary model of risk and risk-
aversion, with ↵0 being larger the more likely it is that an A-worker is transformed into a
31In interview studies, employees report caring about the well-being of their co-workers and not only
their own (Blinder and Choi, 1990, Campbell and Kamlani, 1997, Agell and Lundborg, 1999). There are
several complementary reasons why the well paid workers may prefer more equal wages. One reason is
that the median workers care for other people with lower wages. Another reason may be that people do
not know their own (or their childrens’) future wage (Agell and Lommerud, 1992).
32The debate within Swedish unions demonstrates that also the choice of norm is part of the issue. The
Swedish unions’ wage policy became more radical in the late 1960:ies. Earlier, LO was mainly concerned
with wage diﬀerence between firms and industries. They adhered to a weak equity norm “equal pay for
equal work,” independent of firms’ diﬀerent abilities to pay. LO then switched to the equality norm “equal
pay for all work.” This shift was not only motivated by the more radical spirit of the time. Another
reason was that the middle ground, in the form of a strong equity norm (pay in relation to e.g. eﬀort,
hardship or education), would require a system of job evaluations, which was too diﬃcult to implement.
See e.g. Meidner (1974) and Elster (1989).
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B-worker and the more risk-averse the worker is.33
Consider first the possibility that strategic delegation is impossible or that the unions
have not realized this possibility. Then, the union’s wage policy (i.e. its objective function)
must coincide with the median workers’ true preferences, i.e. ↵ = ↵0. The following result
follows immediately from figure 5:
Proposition 1. Assume that the union’s wage policy must coincide with the median work-
ers’ preferences. The median workers pay for their inequity-aversion (or risk-aversion)
by accepting a lower wage for themselves, unless (i) the monopsonistic eﬃciency wage
premium is suﬃciently large in relation to the direct bargaining premium (14 is satisfied)
and unless (ii) they are suﬃciently averse to inequity or risk (↵0 > ↵˜).
This result provides a possible interpretation of the Swedish experience in the late
1960:ies when unions started to pursue a more egalitarian wage policy, partly as a result
of the more radical ideology of the time (Meidner, 1974). It is possible that the domino
eﬀects, or the strength of them, first came as a surprise to the unions. (Recall that wH
is falling in ↵ at low levels.) It is only much later that the Swedish unions started to
motivate their egalitarian wage policy as a bargaining tactic (Nilsson, 1989).34
5.2 Strategic delegation
A wage negotiation is a strategic situation and the outcome is determined through the
interaction between the firm and the union. As Schelling (1960) pointed out, even if
union representatives are elected to maximize the utility of the median voter, the most
eﬀective representative need not share the principal’s preferences. In fact, one main
idea of this paper is to investigate if the median wage earners can benefit from electing
union representatives with stronger preferences for equity than they have themselves. My
analysis will be framed in terms of such strategic delegation.35
33Assume that an A-worker is transformed into a B-worker with probability 1 p. The median worker’s
expected utility is then EV = p · V  wH   dHA  + (1  p) · V  wL   dLB  where V is concave to represent
risk-aversion. For simplicity assume that V is piece-wise linear with
V 0 (w   d) =
(
1
 
if
w   d < ⇠
w   d > ⇠
where a low   2 [0, 1] signifies risk-aversion. Then, for wH   dHA > ⇠ > wL  dLB , expected utility is given
by EV = p · (1   ) · ⇠ + p ·   ·  wH   dHA   + (1  p) ·  wL   dLB  which after an aﬃne transformation
becomes EV˜ = p· p· +(1 p) ·
 
wH   dHA
 
+ (1 p)p· +(1 p) ·
 
wL   dLB
 
. Then, ↵0 = (1 p)p· +(1 p) is increasing in risk
(a lower p) and in risk-aversion (a lower  ).
34Against the surprise hypothesis, it may be said that the central framework agreements contained
clauses related to wage drift already from 1966.
35Schelling mentions several other bargaining tactics that may achieve similar results as delegation.
These tactics presume that the initiative comes from the leadership. The union leadership may publicly
announce their ambition to raise the wages of the least well oﬀ, thereby making themselves responsible
for fulfilling the expectations they create. European unions often articulate normative views about
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Assume first that the A-workers do not care for equity at all (↵0 = 0). Still, if the union
can commit to a wage policy that deviates from the median workers’ true preferences, it
will clearly pursue an extreme egalitarian wage policy (↵ = 1) if their own wage would
increase as a result of such a policy (i.e. if inequality 14 is satisfied).
But the motive may also be a mix of fairness and strategy. Expressed diﬀerently,
even in the case when an egalitarian wage policy would result in a lower wage for the
A-workers, i.e. wHeh < wHel , they may still wish to pursue an egalitarian wage policy since
(i) their loss is relatively modest thanks to the domino eﬀects and since (ii) they may care
about fairness.
To see this, first recall that the A-workers will choose one of the two extreme wage
policies for the union. The reason is that the B-workers’ wage is increasing in the unions’
equity concerns and that the A-workers’ wage is quasi-convex in the union’s equity con-
cerns. Moreover, in case the negotiator maximizes the median wage premium (↵ = 0),
the equilibrium wage structure is given by
 
wHeh, w
L
eh
 
and the A-workers’ utility is given
by (1  ↵0) · 11   ·   · S. In case the negotiator maximizes the low-wage premium (↵ = 1),
the equilibrium wage structure is given by
 
wHel , w
L
el
 
and the A-workers’ utility is given by
(1  ↵0) ·
⇣
  · S˜ + r
⌘
+↵0 ·  1   ·
⇣
  · S˜
⌘
. Thus, the A-workers prefer an extreme egalitarian
wage policy over an extreme median-biased policy if
r > ✓0 · 1
1    ·   · S, (15)
where ✓0 =   ↵01  + ·  ↵0  ✓ is a decreasing function of ↵0. Otherwise, they elect a negotiator
maximizing the median wage. In sum:
Proposition 2. The median workers prefer an extreme egalitarian wage policy if, and
only if, the monopsonistic eﬃciency wage premium is large enough compared to the direct
bargaining premium. The more the median workers care about fairness (or the more
risk-averse they are), the lower is the requirement on the monopsonistic eﬃciency wage
premium.
This proposition formalizes the idea that unions pursue egalitarian wage policies partly
for strategic reasons as a result of the domino eﬀect. Even if the median workers’ true
distributive justice, with which they justify their wage claims, at the outset of every collective bargaining
round. The distributive conflict - as presented by the unions - is not only one between capital and labor
but also one between diﬀerent groups of employees (Schulten, 2004). In the longer run the union might be
able to build up a reputation for strong equity concerns by striking for increased wages at the bottom. It
may also be possible for the union to commit to an egalitarian wage policy and improving its bargaining
position by evoking or strengthening the sense of solidarity among its members. An american example
is Walter Reuther, head of the United Auto Workers (UAW), who aimed to “reshape the consciousness
of millions of industrial workers, making them disciplined trade unionists, militant social democrats, and
racial egalitarians” (see Lichtenstein, 1995). More broadly, Western & Rosenfeld (2011) argue that the
(industry) unions’ promotion of distributional norms in public discourse has reduced wage inequality
through many diﬀerent channels, also outside the wage negotiation room. My analysis is complementary
in demonstrating how an equity norm, focusing on the lowest wages, may benefit all union members.
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equity concerns are modest, an egalitarian wage policy may increase their wage if the
eﬃciency wage premium is large enough. The proposition thus formalizes the views
expressed by Swedish unions: “Even if only a few people are aﬀected directly, increasing
the lowest wages is absolutely decisive for the wage level of the entire group” (Kommunal,
2003; Landsorganisationen, 2011).
My study helps clarify why and when the unions are able to increase the general wage
level by redirecting their bargaining power from wages in general to a focus on the lowest
wages. But my analysis also reveals a couple of limitations. First, as already noted above,
the union may not even discover the importance of the domino eﬀects unless the workers
actually have quite substantial equity concerns (↵0 >  ). Second note that if the A-
workers’ true equity concerns are modest (↵0 <  ), the union’s policy must deviate quite
substantially from the median workers’ preferences (i.e. ↵ > ↵˜ >   > ↵0) to ensure that
the median workers do not lose part of their own wage premium. This result suggests that
strategic commitment initiated by the union leadership may be a risky strategy. Such a
policy may alienate well-paid members if they do not understand the logic of the strategy.
Consider finally a situation where the domino eﬀects are insuﬃcient for an egalitarian
wage policy to increase the wage for the A-workers, i.e. wHeh < wHel . The union may nev-
ertheless pursue an extreme egalitarian wage policy for mixed reasons, i.e. a combination
of fairness and strategy. In particular, the A-workers prefer an extreme egalitarian wage
policy over an extreme median-biased policy, if their loss is suﬃciently modest thanks to
the domino eﬀects and if their equity concerns are suﬃciently strong. Rewriting inequality
15, reveals that the critical condition is given by
↵0 > ↵ ⌘    (1   ) · (1   ) · r1
1   ·   · S   r
,
where r < 11   ·   · S (since wHeh < wHel ). The following result is immediate:
Corollary 1. Even a slight weakening of the median worker’s equity concerns (from any
level above ↵ to any level below) may result in a substantial reduction of the wage share
and a substantial increase in wage inequality.
In Sweden, the blue-collar union members’ support for an egalitarian wage policy
actually has decreased somewhat during the last decades.36 It is thus conceivable that a
change in the union members’ preferences for equity may have contributed to the increase
in wage inequality as well as the reduction of the wage share observed during the last
decades.
36This is documented in recurrent surveys (LO, 2011b).
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6 Extensions
6.1 Unemployment
Part of the reason why egalitarian wage policies attract so much attention is their eﬀects
on unemployment. This section demonstrates that while unemployment may reduce the
incentives for an egalitarian wage policy, such a policy may still be preferred.37 I also
show that unemployment may weaken the “domino eﬀect.” That is, increasing the lowest
wage increases wages higher up in the distribution, but by a smaller amount.
High wage-costs may cause unemployment for at least two reasons. First, there may
be a fixed number of identical firms operating under decreasing returns to scale. Then,
wage costs may be too high for “marginal jobs” to be viable. Second, there may be free
entry with increasing entry costs as more firms enter. Entry costs may increase either
because heterogenous firms enter in order of eﬃciency or because of inelastic supply of
some necessary “entry resource.” In any case, wage costs may be too high for “marginal
firms” to be viable.
A model with increasing entry costs Consider the following entry model. There
is a mass µ of potential firms and entry costs are distributed according to some cumu-
lative distribution function F (c). Firms enter and hire workers in order of eﬃciency.
Considering an equilibrium with vH   wH > vL   wL, the most eﬃcient firms hire A-
workers and the marginal firms hire B-workers. The least eﬃcient firm entering the
market has entry cost c = vL wL.38 If 1    µ ·F  vL   wL   1, there is full employ-
ment among the A-workers and the employment rate among the B-workers is given by
'
 
wL
 
=
⇥
µ · F  vL   wL   (1   )⇤ /   1 with '0  wL  =  µ · F 0  vL   wL  /   0.
Assuming that workers must choose whether to search for L- or H-jobs, the A-workers’
incentive compatibility constraint is given by
wH   dHA  
 
wL   dLA
  · '  wL  .
37When the employers have a great deal of monopsony power and wages are set below the B-workers’
reservation level, an egalitarian wage policy may actually reduce unemployment. (Computations may be
obtained from the author upon request.) These mechanisms may be part of the reason for the mixed
empirical evidence on the employment eﬀects of (collectively negotiated) minimum wages. Katz and
Kreuger (1992), Card (1992a, b) and Card and Kreuger (1993) point at cases when increased statutory
minimum wages increased employment of B-workers. Neumark and Wascher (1992) show that the eﬀects
may be positive in the short run and negative in the long run. In countries where minimum wages are
determined through collective negotiations, the minimum wages appear to be higher but also more diﬀer-
entiated with respect to age, seniority and occupation. The eﬀects on employment may well be diﬀerent
there. Skedinger (2006) finds relatively large adverse eﬀect, using Swedish data. The most encompassing
survey of the empirical literature concludes that most of the evidence indicates adverse eﬀects (albeit not
always statistically significant). There is, however, substantial variation between diﬀerent studies and
the mechanisms are still unknown (Neumark and Wascher, 2007).
38Assuming that the firms hiring B-workers cannot easily reorganize to hire A-workers, there is no
competition for A-workers after firms have entered.
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For low wages, ' = 1 and the new incentive constraint coincides with the old. For high
wages, ' = 0 and the new incentive constraint coincides with the A-workers’ individual
rationality constraint. For intermediate wages, the new incentive constraint is between
the old incentive constraint and the individual rationality constraint.
For additional concreteness it may be assumed that the B-workers’ employment rate is
given by '˜
 
wL
 
= 1 # · wL dLB
vL dLB
. Note that #   0 indicates the sensitivity of employment
to wage cost and that employment is inelastic if entry cost variability is large.39 Then,
the new incentive compatibility constraint coincides with the old one for all wages up to
wL = dLB. Beyond that point, the new incentive constraint is first increasing and then
decreasing. If the wage elasticity of employment, #, is low enough the incentive constraint
is increasing for all wL  vL as described in figure 6.
Figure 6: Unemployment
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A model with decreasing returns to scale The same model can be reinterpreted to
represent decreasing returns to scale at the level of the firm. In this case, it is assumed
that each job in the firm is associated with some cost and that the additional cost of
a job is increasing in the number of jobs that the firm has already opened. Now F (c)
represents the share of jobs in the firm with a cost below c.
Results Clearly, taking unemployment into account reduces the incentives for strategic
delegation. The first reason is that the incentive compatibility constraint is weakened.
For a given wL, eﬃciency can be achieved at a lower wH . The second reason is that the
B-workers’ interest in increasing their own wage is weakened by unemployment. It is easy
39This functional form can be motivated the following way. Assume that entry costs are uni-
formly distributed on the interval [k   s, k + s] where k is the expected entry cost. Entry costs
may be negative if firms earn positive profits in other markets. The number of firms and employ-
ment is given by   =
´ c
k s
µ
2s · dz = µ2s · (c  k + s). The B-workers’ employment rate is given by
' =   (1  )  = ⇠ ·
⇥
vL   (k   s)  ⇠ 1 · 1   
⇤  ⇠ ·wL where ⇠ = µ2s  . If k =  vL   dLB   sµ · (2  µ), then
' = 1 + µ2s  ·
 
dLB   wL
 
. Letting µ2s  = #
1
vL dLB
delivers the desired result.
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to see that A-workers would not engage in strategic delegation if the wage elasticity of
employment, #, is high enough.
For # low enough, all the previous propositions remain valid. If the employers can
set wages unilaterally, both the A-workers’ incentive compatibility constraint and the B-
workers individual rationality constraint bind. Then, the equilibrium wage structure is
given by wL = dLB and wH = dHA+
 
wL   dLA
 ·'  wL  = dHA+r, as before. This equilibrium
is illustrated by the E-dot. Increasing a union’s bargaining power, assuming the union
representative to maximize the wage for H-jobs, leaves the equilibrium wage schedule
at the E-dot, since the (direct) bargaining premium simply replaces the eﬃciency wage
premium. Assuming the union representative to maximize B-workers expected utility 
wL   dLB
  · '˜  wL  and increasing union bargaining power moves the equilibrium wage
schedule up along the incentive compatibility constraint, increasing both wages. Thus,
whenever the union’s bargaining power is not too high, the A-workers prefer an egalitarian
wage policy.
There is one new feature. The more bargaining power the union has, the higher are
wages and (more interestingly) the lower is the wage diﬀerence in absolute terms. The
reason why the wage diﬀerence decreases with increased union power is that the slope of
the incentive compatibility constraint is lower than unity, i.e.
dwH
dwL
= '+
 
wL   dLA
  · '0  1,
with strict inequality in case there is some unemployment among the B-workers.
6.2 Other rationales for eﬃciency wage-diﬀerentials
The key property of this part of the model is that the firm’s output is increased from a low
level to a high level if the wage diﬀerence between L- and H-jobs exceeds a threshold. In
particular, the A-workers incentive-compatibility constraint entails that output is given
by   · vL + (1   ) · vH whenever wH   wL   dHA   dLA. Otherwise output is only vL.
The model assumes that this positive relation between firm productivity and wage
diﬀerences arises as a result of adverse selection and screening. An example is that firms
may use wage diﬀerences based on formal education to identify worker types and to
inspire A-workers to invest in education (Spence, 1973).40 Similarly, firms may use wage
diﬀerences based on job requirements to induce their A-workers to volunteer for jobs with
less desirable characteristics in terms of location, safely or cleanliness.
But similar and formally equivalent relations between firm productivity and wage
40Assume that workers with basic education produce vL while workers with advanced education produce
vH . Assume also that the A-workers have a lower cost of schooling. If firms condition wages on formal
education and if the wage diﬀerence is large enough, the A-workers have an incentive to choose the longer
education.
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diﬀerences could arise for many diﬀerent reasons, e.g. moral hazard. When it is diﬃcult
or expensive for firms to quantify individual output, but ranking workers is easy, a rank
order tournament may be an eﬃcient way to compensate labor (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
Tournament theory suggests that firms promote and pay a premium to some senior workers
as a ’prize’ to those who put in the most eﬀorts.41
According to the “sociological” foundations of eﬃciency wages, a worker’s wage is
valued both for its purchasing power and for the relative status it implies. If status-
conscious A-workers express their dissatisfaction with a relative wage compression by
reducing work eﬀort, firms may find it in their profit-maximizing interest to increase the
A-workers’ wages when the lowest wages are increased, in an attempt to restore work
eﬀort (Grossman, 1983).
7 Concluding remarks
A survey of the economic theory of trade unions concluded that the fundamental weak
spot of this theory is our understanding of the unions’ goals and how these goals relate
to both the institutional structure of the unions and to the collective bargaining process
itself. Even if an obvious goal is to maximize the wage bill, the classic question “Whose
wage bill?” is still left without an answer (Kaufman, 2002, pp. 146-149). The empirical
literature suggests that unions have egalitarian preferences. And also the union rhetoric
supports this view. The present paper indicates that the conflict between workers may
have been exaggerated. Fighting for the lowest wages may be an eﬃcient union strategy
to increase the wages of all their members.
Moreover, in a companion paper, I demonstrate hat the decisions by workers of diﬀer-
ent skills to unite to form industry unions is closely linked to the egalitarian wage policies
that such unions pursue.
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A Proof that employers induce the eﬃcient outcome
Let wHIC
 
wL
 
= dHA +
 
wL   dLA
 
be the lowest wage wH that satisfies the ICH-constraint
for a given wL. Similarly, let wLIC
 
wH
 
= dLA +
 
wH   dHA
 
be the lowest wage wL that
satisfies the ICH-constraint for a given wH . In the following figure, the diagonal line is
part of the IC-constraint. The figure shows the hiring outcome of every possible wage
schedule. In region B, all wage schedules induce the A-workers to take on L-jobs and the
B-workers to remain unemployed, and so on.
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Figure 7: Hiring outcomes
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Area A Any wage schedule in any of the four areas marked by A, implies that no one
will work. Clearly a change to any wage schedule in the interior of the shaded region
benefits all workers and the firm at the same time.
Area J Consider any
 
wH , wL
 
such that wL 2 ⇥dLB, vL⇤ and wH < wHIC  wL . Such
a wage schedule implies that both types of workers are hired in L-jobs. Then, a switch
to
 
wHIC
 
wL
 
, wL
 
is Pareto sanctioned. The B-workers apply for and will be hired in
L-jobs in both cases. Thus, they are unaﬀected by the change. The A-workers will switch
from L-jobs to H-jobs. The change in their utility is given by
 
dHA +
 
wL   dLA
   dHA    
wL   dLA
 
= 0. Since the change increases the total surplus and since the workers surplus
unchanged, the firm must gain.
Area C Consider any
 
wH , wL
 
such that wL 2 ⇥dLB, vL⇤ and wH > vH . Such a wage
schedule implies that both types of workers are hired in L-jobs. (The A-workers would
prefer a H-job, but such jobs are not oﬀered.) Reducing the wage for high jobs to wH 2⇥
dHA , v
H
⇤
implies that the A-workers will be in H-jobs instead. Such switch does not aﬀect
the B-workers. The A-workers do not lose if wH   dHA   wL   dLA. The firm does not
lose if vH   wH   vL   wL. If the wage is set to make the A-workers indiﬀerent, i.e.
wH = wHIC
 
wL
 
= wL + dHA   dLA, the firm will gain since vH   dHA   vL   dLA.
Area D Any wage schedule
 
wH , wL
 
in area D is Pareto dominated by
 
wH , dLB
 
. The
workers’ welfare are unchanged, but the firm gains.
Area E All wage schedules
 
wH , wL
 
in area E imply that the A-workers are hired
in H-jobs while the B-workers are unemployed. Consider the alternative wage schedule 
wHIC
 
dLB
 
, dLB
 
. This wage schedule implies that the B-workers start to work in L-jobs
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while the A-workers remain in H-jobs. The B-workers utility is unaﬀected, since they are
paid their reservation wage. The A-workers are better oﬀ since their wage is increased.
The employer prefers the eﬃcient outcome if
  ·  vL   dLB + (1   ) ·  vH    dHA + dLB   dLA     (1   ) ·  vH   wH  .
The worst-case scenario for the employers is if wH = dHA before the change. Then the
employers prefer the eﬃcient outcome if
  ·  vL   dLB + (1   ) ·  vH    dHA + dLB   dLA     (1   ) ·  vH   dHA   ,
i.e.
  ·  vL   dLB    (1   ) ·  dLB   dLA  .
The requirement is that the B-workers create a surplus that is larger than the eﬃciency
wage premium earned by the A-workers, i.e.
  ·  vL   dLB    (1   ) ·  dLB   dLA 
This is simply condition equation (10).
Area I A similar argument as in the case of area J demonstrates that all wage schedules
in area I are Pareto dominated by increasing wH to wHIC
 
wL
 
. The same argument as in
the case of area E demonstrates that all these wage schedules are Pareto dominated by
increasing the wage in L-jobs to
 
wHIC
 
dLB
 
, dLB
 
, if and only if equation (10) is satisfied.
Area B A similar argument as in the case of area C demonstrates that all wage schedules
in area B are Pareto dominated by decreasing wH to wHIC
 
wL
 
. The same argument as
in the case of area E demonstrates that all these wage schedules are Pareto dominated by
increasing the wage in L-jobs to
 
wHIC
 
dLB
 
, dLB
 
, if and only if equation (10) is satisfied.
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